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A Tale of Three Bishops: 
Mapping the ideologies of “Chineseness” and 
“Asian Values” in the Global Anglican 
Realignment in Vancouver 
 






Most accounts of the 2002 departure of some conservative Anglican 
parishes from Vancouver’s Diocese of New Westminster (DoNW) 
over same-sex blessings seemed to fit the narrative of a battle over 
sexuality in the global realignment of the Anglican Communion. 
However, attention to the consecration of two new Chinese Anglican 
bishops—Silas Ng Tak-yin and Stephen Leung Wing-hong, both from 
Hong Kong—reveals that their split from the DoNW’s Bishop 
Michael Ingham had more to do with an ideology of cultural 
pluralization deploying “Asian values.” I, therefore, argue that the 
schism in Vancouver was a division over the three bishops’ 
imaginations of global futures with “Chineseness” and “Asian values” 
as proxy words for this ideology. This paper contributes to the study 
of Chinese Christianities—as well as other religions—by examining 
“Chineseness” as an empty category that can be deployed for a 
variety of ideologies. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Justin K. H. TSE (XIE Jianheng ???) is visiting assistant professor of Asian American 
Studies at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
REVISITING CHINESENESS AND ASIAN VALUES 
IN THE GLOBAL ANGLICAN REALIGNMENT 
IN VANCOUVER 
 
Although the roots of Anglicanism lie in the Church of England, its 
contemporary situation feels more like the opening line in the Chinese 
literary classic, Three Kingdoms (San guo yan yi ????)—The 
saying of the trend under heaven, what is divided will be united, and 
what is united will divide (????????????????1)—an 
appropriate comparison, I suggest, because of the unexpected ways that 
ideologies of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” influence the 
worldwide Anglican family. Divided over questions of theological 
authority and state power since the sixteenth-century Protestant 
Reformation, the English church and its colonial outposts in Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas became united in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as a global “Anglican Communion,” a 
commonwealth of thirty-eight autonomous provinces affectionately 
held together by a common set of traditions, polities, and succession of 
bishops (regional pastors exercising “episcopal” oversight). The four 
“instruments of unity” that have held the Communion together have 
conventionally focused on the Archbishop of Canterbury as (1) a 
symbolic figure of global unity, primus inter pares (“first among 
equals”) who (2) chairs the meeting of primates (the representative 
provincial archbishops), (3) hosts a decadal conference of Anglican 
delegates from all over the world at Lambeth Palace (his residence in 
London), and (4) presides over the Anglican Consultative Council’s 
(ACC) efforts to build unity through the Communion. 
Once united, the Anglican Communion divided into what is being 
called the “global Anglican realignment.” The story is usually told 
without reference to Chineseness and Asian values. Instead, it often 
focuses on the 2003 consecration of Bishop Gene Robinson, an openly 
                                                                                                                                              
1 The literal translation, from Three Kingdoms ????, is “The saying of the trend 
under heaven, what is divided unites, what is united divides,” although the official 
English translation is, “Here begins our tale. The empire, long divided, must unite; 
long united must divide.” Luo Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms, trans. Moss Roberts 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1991), 5. 
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gay divorcé, in the Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire, sending 
shockwaves through conservative parishes in the United States and 
Canada, as well as across the “Global South,” a region comprising 
“Africa, Asia, and Latin America” where historian Philip Jenkins 
claims that “the center of gravity in the Christian world has shifted.”2 
After pushing for a resolution “rejecting homosexual practice as in-
compatible with Scripture” at the Lambeth Conference in 1998,3 the 
Global South primates realigned some parishes in the Episcopal 
Church of the United States (TEC) and the Anglican Church of Canada 
(ACoC) through initiatives like the “Anglican Mission in the Ameri-
cas” (AMiA), a mission founded by the Rwandan House of Bishops in 
2001 and supported by their Southeast Asian counterparts.4 By 2008, 
the Anglican realignment had produced a competitor to the Lambeth 
Conference called the “Global Anglican Future Conference” 
(GAFCON); by 2009, it had also established the “Anglican Church in 
North America” (ACNA) as an alternative to TEC and ACoC, although 
AMiA has not joined this new province to date.5 With TEC’s conse-
cration of an openly lesbian bishop Mary Glasspool in Los Angeles in 
that same year, communion between the realignment and the Global 
North became definitively impaired. 
Seldom discussed in this narrative are the ideologies of “Chinese-
ness” and “Asian values” that have come to play an important role in 
the Communion, not least due to the prominence of Chinese Anglicans 
on the Communion’s world stage (such as Hong Kong’s Archbishop 
Paul Kwong [Kuang Baoluo ???] who began chairing the ACC in 
April 2016). This absence is especially felt in discussions of the rea-
                                                                                                                                              
2 Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2; Jenkins develops the “Global South” thesis 
in The New Faces of Christianity: Believing in the Global South (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
3 XII Lambeth Conference, “Human Sexuality,” Resolution 10, in Section I Resolu-
tions: “Called to Full Humanity,” d, e. See Ian T. Douglas, “The Exigency of Times 
and Occasions: Power and Identity in the Anglican Communion Today,” in Beyond 
Colonialism Anglicanism: The Anglican Communion in the Twenty-First Century, 
eds. Ian T. Douglas and Kwok Pui-lan (New York: Church, 2001), especially 25–26. 
4 See Miranda K. Hassett, Anglican Communion in Crisis: How Episcopal Dissidents 
and Their African Allies Are Reshaping Anglicanism (Princeton: Princeton Universi-
ty Press, 2007); Thaddeus Barnum, Never Silent: How Third World Missionaries Are 
Now Bringing the Gospel to the US (Colorado Springs: Eleison, 2008). 
5 See Joanna Sadgrove, Robert M. Vanderbeck, Kevin Ward, Gill Valentine, and Jo-
han Andersson, “Constructing the Boundaries of Anglican Orthodoxy: An Analysis 
of the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON),” Religion 40, no. 3 (2010): 
193–206. 
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lignment of three Chinese parishes in Vancouver, two of which have 
become episcopal seats for the realignment bishops Silas Tak-yin Ng 
(Wu Dexian ???; AMiA) and Stephen Wing-hong Leung (Liang 
Yongkang ??? ; ACNA)—both of Hong Kong origin—in the 
ACoC’s Diocese of New Westminster (DoNW). Ostensibly, the split 
with the DoNW’s Bishop Michael Ingham occurred over the DoNW 
synod’s approval of a public rite for blessing same-sex unions in 2002, 
an act that is often considered the Canadian counterpart to TEC’s con-
troversy over gay and lesbian bishops. 
I contend that the Vancouver case needs to be examined in its own 
right. Indeed, I read it as a dispute over Chineseness and Asian values, 
of which sexuality was only symptomatic, even though the road lead-
ing to the 2016 gender-neutral amendment of the ACoC’s marriage 
canon has itself been contentious. The schism, as I shall demonstrate, 
exceeded the sexuality issues because they originated from division 
over various global futures being imagined for the Anglican Commun-
ion in a globalizing world. These different imaginaries often used dif-
ferent versions of Chineseness and Asian values as ideological proxies 
to talk about global economic realities that Anglicans should address. 
Perhaps as equally important as the oft-discussed sexuality issues (or 
even more so), these ideological imaginations of Chineseness and 
Asian values, I argue, lie at the heart of the Anglican Communion’s 
fractures in Vancouver, for it is through them that the three bishops 
imagine vastly different global futures with which they propose that the 
Anglicans should align. Indeed, what is divided will be united, and 
what is united will be divided—based on the prognostications of glob-
alization. 
I will seek to demonstrate this argument in several parts. First, I will 
elaborate on my theory of ideology in order to clarify how I see 
Chineseness and Asian values at work in constituting Global 
Anglicanism. This will be followed by a brief methodological 
statement. I will then tell the tale of the three bishops in Vancouver in 
relation to each other as they have struggled since the 1990s over how 
to use Chineseness and Asian values to imagine Vancouver’s future as 
a global city. Instead of treating each bishop as an ideal type, I will 
move through the history of the realignment in Vancouver in three 
subsections, with each bishop as a heuristic guide. I will first discuss 
Ingham’s collision with conservative Asian Anglicans over religious 
pluralism in the 1990s. Then the story will move to Ng’s central role as 
a charismatic exorcist in the conservative Anglicans’ walk-out from the 
2002 DoNW synod to form the Anglican Communion in New 
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Westminster (ACiNW); I will expound next on the role of Ng’s 
supernatural sensibilities in the ACiNW split between the AMiA 
charismatics (represented by the Anglican Coalition in Canada [ACiC] 
as an AMiA network) and ACNA evangelicals (as a Canadian ACNA 
diocese called the Anglican Network in Canada [ANiC]) in the late 
2000s. Finally, I will explore Leung’s philosophical musings on being 
formed as a “shame-based” “Asian” Anglican in the legal milieu of 
ANiC’s wrangling in court with the DoNW in the late 2000s over their 
final withdrawal from the ACoC in 2008; this ultimately led to his 
elevation as bishop over ANiC’s Asian and Multicultural Ministries in 
Canada (AMMiC). My hope is that this reading of Chinese ideologies 
in the Anglican Communion will advance the study of Chinese 
religions by emphasizing that “Chineseness” is an empty ideological 
category that remains geographically productive because it is often 
used as a cipher to discuss fantasies of global futures. 
 
PREDICTING THE FUTURE: 
CHINESENESS AND ASIAN VALUES 
AS IDEOLOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
What is at stake in the Anglican forms of Chineseness that I explore are 
their projections of futures for a society said to be “global,” utilizing 
the vague terminologies of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” as at-
tempts to rewire the Anglican Church to fit with these socioeconomic 
fantasies. Indeed, as the anthropologist Aihwa Ong points out, “Chi-
neseness” here can be conflated with “Asian values” because the “new 
cultural representations of ‘Chineseness’” must be seen “in relation to 
transnational Asian capitalism,” which is what is usually denoted by 
the word “global” in contemporary conversations about “globaliza-
tion.” However, my usage of “Asian values” is broader than critical 
theorist Slavoj Žižek’s understanding of “capitalism with Asian values” 
as an emerging form of “authoritarian” capitalism that “no longer needs 
Western cultural values in order to function smoothly,” wealth accu-
mulation unwedded to “egalitarianism, fundamental human rights, the 
welfare state, to name a few.”6 In my tale, “Asianness” is simply an 
                                                                                                                                              
6 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 16. 
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empty signifier, an ideological cipher for a number of global futures 
that are certainly capitalistic but differ in modes of governance. In this 
sense, I find myself agreeing with Žižek’s broader description of the 
ideological as “not the ‘false consciousness’ of a (social) being but this 
being itself in so far as it is supported by ‘false consciousness.’”7 
However, I hope also to show that these ideological projects seldom 
achieve completion; if anything, ideologies of Asian values have di-
vided the Anglican Communion, especially in the DoNW, because (as 
we shall see) there are simply too many ways to be “Asian” or “Chi-
nese.” 
This materialistic emphasis on capital as a generator of cultural 
ideology is especially pressing in Vancouver. Urban geographers have 
long noted that policies in Vancouver adopted after the 1986 World 
Exposition (“Expo 86”) led not only to the gentrification of 
working-class neighborhoods and former manufacturing buildings, but 
also to the placing of Vancouver on an “international property 
market.”8 This shift in policy coincided with a spike in Chinese 
immigration in light of the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to Chinese 
sovereignty, bringing the population of ethnic Chinese in Metro 
Vancouver to just under 400,000 by the late 2000s.9 These new 
                                                                                                                                              
7 Slavoj Žižek, Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors: Against the 
Double Blackmail (London: Melville House, 2016), 23. Italics are original. 
8 Literature on the global restructuring of Vancouver as an international property mar-
ket, especially with respect to Chinese migrations in the Asia-Pacific, includes: Kris 
Olds and Katharyne Mitchell, “Chinese Business Networks and the Globalization of 
Property Markets in the Pacific Rim,” in Globalization of Chinese Business Firms, 
eds. Henry Yeung and Kris Olds (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), 195–219; 
Kris Olds, Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim 
Mega-Projects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Katharyne Mitchell, 
Crossing the Neoliberal Line: Pacific Rim Migration and the Metropolis (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2004); David Edgington, Michael Goldberg, and Tom 
Hutton, “Hong Kong Business, Money, and Migration in Vancouver, Canada,” in 
From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim 
Countries, ed. Wei Li (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 155–183; David 
Ley, Millionaire Migrants: Trans-Pacific Life Lines (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010). 
9 For overview of the Hong Kong diaspora, see Ronald Skelton, ed., Reluctant Exiles? 
Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese (Armond, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1994); Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1999); Gary Hamilton, ed., Cosmopolitan Capitalists: 
Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the Twentieth Century (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2000). Peter Li notes that Chinese migrations to 
Canada prior to 1997 tended to be from Hong Kong; after 1997, Hong Kong migra-
tion fell while mainland Chinese migration increased significantly; see Peter Li, “The 
Rise and Fall of Chinese Immigration to Canada: Newcomers from Hong Kong SAR 
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migrants brought new market-oriented practices to Vancouver: They 
accumulated familial capital through the transnational strategies of 
“astronaut families” where working adults embark on a “Pacific 
shuttle” between Vancouver and the Asia-Pacific for employment,10 
they brought young students to obtain an “international education” in 
Vancouver as “cultural capital” to facilitate future employment in 
Asia,11 they participated in “circular migration” between Asia and 
North America throughout their life cycle.12 As a hub for both offshore 
property investment and transnational Chinese migrations, Vancouver 
became a “global city,” a command-and-control center of the global 
economy (as it is often described in urban sociology),13 a city through 
which global capital flows, facilitated in this case especially by 
transnational Chinese familial networks.14 In this sense, Vancouver 
has been termed a “global city” and Hong Kong an “international 
financial centre,” not unlike the framing of the Anglican Communion 
as a “global commonwealth.” The question over which the three 
bishops disagreed was: By what are those new geographies constituted, 
and how should Anglicans fit ideologically into those new global 
economic realities? 
Indeed, this tale of three bishops, as I am telling it, is the story of 
how Anglicans seek to be active agents in what they take to be emerg-
ing global societies through the language of “Chineseness” and “Asian 
                                                                                                                                              
of China and Mainland China, 1980–2000,” International Migration 43, no. 3 
(2005): 9–32. Ethnography of the new mainland Chinese migrations to Vancouver 
can be found in Teo Sin-yih, “Vancouver’s Newest Chinese Diaspora: Settlers or 
‘Immigrant Prisoners’?” GeoJournal 68 (2007): 211–222. 
10 Johanna L. Waters, “Flexible Families? ‘Astronaut’ Households and the Experiences 
of Lone Mothers in Vancouver, British Columbia,” Social and Cultural Geography 
3, no. 2 (2002): 117–134; “Flexible Citizens? Transnationalism and Citizenship 
amongst Economic Immigrants in Vancouver,” The Canadian Geographer 47, no. 3 
(2003): 219–234. 
11 Johanna L. Waters, Education, Migration, and Cultural Capital in the Chinese Di-
aspora (Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2008). 
12 David Ley and Audrey Kobayashi, “Back to Hong Kong: Return Migration or 
Transnational Sojourn?” Global Networks 5 (2005): 111–128. A critique of this nar-
rative as overly determinative of Hong Kong migrants’ movements can be found in 
Justin K. H. Tse and Johanna L. Waters, “Transnational Youth Transitions: Becom-
ing Adults between Vancouver and Hong Kong,” Global Networks 13, no. 4 (2013): 
535–550. 
13 John Friedmann, “The World City Hypothesis,” Development and Change 17, no. 1 
(1986): 69–83; Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
14 Karen Y. P. Lai, “New Spatial Logics in Global Cities Research: Networks, Flows, 
and New Political Spaces,” Geography Compass 3, no. 3 (2009): 997–1012. 
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values.” The Chinese Anglicans who populate my story are mostly 
from Hong Kong. Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, Hong Kong 
is usually seen as Chinese Anglicanism’s symbolic center, as it was the 
place where the exiled Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (Zhong hua sheng 
gong hui ?????), the Anglican territory encompassing all of Chi-
na, came to settle in exile after the Chinese Communist Revolution in 
1949. While the Anglican province of Hong Kong is officially called 
the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (HKSKH, Xiang gang sheng gong hui
?????), all Chinese Anglican and Episcopal parishes throughout 
the world are also called “Sheng Kung Hui” (SKH, Sheng gong hui ?
??), the “holy public community.” 
Pairing the global geographies of the SKH with the realignment, two 
configurations come to light. On the one hand, HKSKH is usually 
aligned with the Global North Anglican provinces of the Church of 
England (CoE), TEC, and the ACoC. While the HKSKH does not en-
dorse same-sex unions,15 HKSKH’s provincial secretary Rev. Peter 
Douglas Ho-ming Koon (Guan Haoming ???) is often sent as an 
observer to TEC’s General Conventions, Kwong currently chairs the 
London-based ACC, and HKSKH’s claim to fame is that it is the first 
province to have ordained a woman, Rev. Florence Tim-oi Li (Li 
Tianai ???), to the priesthood in the 1940s, starting a contentious 
series of conversations across the Communion about women priests 
and bishops.16 Moreover, it was in Hong Kong where the ACC held an 
emergency meeting during the DoNW crisis in 2002. 
On the other hand, that the realignment in Vancouver encompassed 
all three of the DoNW’s Chinese parishes—the historic Chinatown 
mission Church of the Good Shepherd (GSC, Mu ai tang ???), St 
Matthias’ and St Luke’s Church (Sheng lu jia sheng ma ti ya tang ??
                                                                                                                                              
15 “HKSKH Sentiments with Respect to Certain Anglican Issues,” The English Echo 
266 (June 2010): 3–4. 
16 Indeed, the ordination case of Rev. Florence Tim-oi Li is cited in the DoNW’s re-
sponse to the 2004 Windsor Report on Communion: The criteria is that unilateral de-
cisions of local dioceses could not be made without the rest of the Communion; Dio-
cese of New Westminster, Anglican Church of Canada, Diocesan Response to the 
Windsor Report, Adopted by the 103rd Session of the Synod of the Diocese Meeting 
on May 13 and 14, 2005 (Vancouver, BC: Anglican Church of Canada, 2005), para. 
9–13. The Windsor Report had chided the DoNW for authorizing a rite of same-sex 
blessings that “at this time goes against the formally expressed opinions of the In-
struments of Unity and therefore constitutes action in breach of the legitimate appli-
cation of the Christian faith as the churches of the Anglican Communion have re-
ceived it, and of bonds of affection in the life of the Communion, especially the 
principle of interdependence.” The Lambeth Commission on Communion: The Wind-
sor Report 2004 (London: The Anglican Communion Office, 2004), para. 141. 
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??????), and Emmanuel Church in Richmond (REC, Yi ma nei li 
tang ?????)—suggests that the Chineseness at work in the Van-
couver case needs to be more closely examined. For one, these parishes 
were realigned with Global South Anglicanism. But this is an anomaly 
when compared with the dominant global geographies of the SKH 
aligning with the Global North. As we shall see, the coincidence that 
the realignment parishes were led by Asian Anglicans can be associat-
ed with the role played in Vancouver by the Anglican Province of 
Southeast Asia (PSEA), a province comprising Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Brunei that was granted autocephaly by the Archbishop of Canter-
bury in 1996. As I shall show, PSEA brokered some of the relation-
ships between Chinese Anglicans in Vancouver and other parts of the 
Communion. In this way, SKH Anglicans are not the only ideological 
generators of Chineseness and Asian values in this story. Instead, both 
Anglicans aligned with the Global North (e.g. ACoC, DoNW, 
HKSKH) and with the Global South (PSEA, ACNA [ANiC], AMiA 
[ACiC]) are invested in making Asian values because they are all in-




This study is part of a larger project on Cantonese-speaking Protestants 
and their engagements with three Pacific Rim civil societies, 
Vancouver, San Francisco, and Hong Kong. For this project, I 
conducted key informant interviews—recorded conversations with 
individuals specifically targeted for their ability to comment on my 
project’s aims—among Cantonese Protestants, of which Bishops Ng 
and Leung were part. There were 50 interviews in Vancouver, 47 in 
San Francisco (including one Episcopalian priest), and 45 in Hong 
Kong (including one Anglican priest and one theologian, but I did not 
interview Archbishop Kwong). As Ingham was not part of this original 
project, I did not interview him. However, Ingham and Kwong are 
public figures with published materials that are arguably adequate as a 
comparative archive with the interview transcripts of the other two 
Chinese bishops. In turn, perhaps part of my ability to access the 
Cantonese Protestants I interviewed was due to the fact that at the time 
of research from 2011 to 2012, I identified myself as a 
Cantonese-speaking Protestant in the Anglican tradition; as a matter of 
full disclosure, I was employed prior to doing this research as a 
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ministry intern discerning a call to ordination in Leung’s parish from 
2006 to 2007 and Ng’s from 2007 to 2009, but there is no financial 
conflict of interest as my employment ended well before my research 
began in 2011. Moreover, I have since become a layperson in the 
Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church. I have also since developed 
friendships with members of the ACoC, including some who pushed at 
the highest levels for sexual liberalization. However, I like to think 
that, even when I was a Protestant and a known entity in some of these 
parishes, the prominence of Cantonese Protestants in Vancouver’s civil 
society in the 2000s would have made them willing to give interviews 
to any interested parties seeking to represent them fairly. All 
interviewees whose names are used in this paper have given written 
permission for their usage in my research. 
 
PLURALIZING ANGLICAN VANCOUVER: BISHOP MICHAEL 
INGHAM’S IDEOLOGY OF CULTURAL PLURALISM 
 
The bishop with whom this tale begins is Michael Ingham, the bishop 
against whom the other bishops in the ACiC and ANiC were later con-
secrated. To understand Ingham’s usage of “Asian values,” it is first 
necessary to describe his overall ideology. Since the 1980s, Ingham has 
attempted to align the ACoC with what he imagined to be a 
“post-Christendom era.” Even before Ingham became the DoNW’s 
bishop in 1994, his first book Rites for a New Age described the disso-
lution of “Christendom”: the alliance of the Christian church with state 
establishments, the presumed superiority of the Christian message over 
other religious teachings, and the oligarchic rule of a few over the 
many. By contrast, Ingham imagined post-Christendom’s new era to 
feature a disestablished church as a “pilgrim” practicing pluralistic in-
terreligious tolerance in a global village marked by radical democratic 
egalitarianism.17 In other words, what was ushering in this new age 
was globalization, a process that Ingham understood as a cultural plu-
ralism inevitably wrought by free circulation of capital throughout the 
world. For Ingham, this new pluralism was worth celebrating: 
                                                                                                                                              
17 Michael Ingham, Rites for a New Age: Understanding the Book of Alternative Ser-
vices (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1986), 22–24. 
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We are once again facing an indifferent and sometimes hostile world. 
We are once again at the edges of power, discovering a new mission 
among the powerless. There is no reason now for triumphancy other 
than the fact that we are still a vessel of the gospel message. But that 
is what energized the apostolic church.18 
In other words, the energy of a post-Christendom theology is based on 
what Ingham assumes to be a new global culture of pluralism, and he 
presumes this cultural shift to be the inevitable product of opening up 
capital to the world, coinciding with shifts within Vancouver toward 
“global city” status in the late 1980s. The church, Ingham held, needed 
to align with these new global realities. 
The problem was an asymmetrical relationship between Ingham’s 
ideology of pluralism and the actual cultural practices of 
Christians—especially Anglicans—from Asia. In the early 1990s, the 
ethnic Chinese leader of Anglicans in Singapore, Bishop Moses Tay 
(Zheng Lingguang ???), caused an uproar in the DoNW when he 
declared that Vancouver needed an exorcism due to the totem poles in 
the downtown Stanley Park. 19  Pluralistic as Ingham’s global 
post-Christendom was, this event signaled that Ingham’s pluralism had 
competition from the very Asian Anglicans he thought would be 
sympathetic to his predictions of the future. In other words, Ingham’s 
passivity before the power of the global economy blindsided him to 
what Jenkins might have called a global “next Christendom” outside of 
his ideology. 
At the heart of this disagreement about “global Christianity” was 
therefore not theological doctrine, per se; it was rather about how to 
conceptualize “Asian religions” based on an ideology of “Asian” val-
ues undergirded by shifts in the global economy. In 1997, Ingham pub-
lished a second book titled Mansions of the Spirit, doubling down on 
his post-Christendom ideology by arguing against what he termed 
“Christian exclusivism,” “the position which holds that such truth as 
can be known about God has been fully revealed in Jesus Christ.”20 
For Ingham, such posturing failed to engage the global non-European 
                                                                                                                                              
18 Ibid, 40. 
19 Jenkins, The Next Christendom, 139–140. Jenkins cites this story from Ferdy Baglo, 
“Canadian Bishop Blocks Asian Church Leader from Visiting His Diocese,” Chris-
tianity Today, November 29, 1999. 
20 Michael Ingham, Mansions of the Spirit: The Gospel in a Multi-Faith World (Toron-
to: Anglican Book Centre, 1997), 51. 
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(read: “Asian,” and “for economic reasons”) migrations, which would 
inevitably (in his mind) bring the world’s religions (like Hinduism and 
Buddhism) to North American global cities like Vancouver. As Ingham 
put it: 
For the first time we are coming into contact with the religions of the 
world embodied in human faces and next-door-neighbour families. 
The relationship, therefore, between Christianity and the world’s re-
ligions is no longer an academic question.21 
In other words, Ingham read the shifts in the global economy as having 
activated Asia as a key source of migration to Vancouver, and for him, 
that meant the inevitable migration of distinctly “Asian” (read: 
non-Christian) religions that required a much more inclusive theology 
in order for the church to accommodate such changing realities in their 
global city. 
Ingham’s imagination of Asia created an ideological rift between 
him and Anglicans aligned with Tay, who soon became the 
newly-formed PSEA’s primate. When Tay sought to visit Vancouver 
again in the late 1990s, Ingham refused to allow it. By contrast, Ingham 
invited the Dalai Lama to Vancouver in the early 2000s—not so much 
to highlight Tibetan independence as a cause, but to reinforce the 
prescriptive ideology of religious pluralism in a global economy by 
organizing interfaith panels on pluralism, eventually culminating in the 
founding of the Interspiritual Centre of Vancouver (ISCV) in 2004. 
The effect, then, of Ingham’s ideological prescriptiveness was not so 
much a flourishing of interreligious pluralism in the DoNW, but the 
introduction of a division in the diocese over the question of what 
constitutes “Asian values” to which Anglicans should accommodate. 
The stage for the dramatic rupture of the DoNW in the 2002 was 
thus set by the ideological fissures over “Asian values” in the 1990s. 
As this story shows, two Anglican blocs had already developed in the 
DoNW by the late 1990s—Ingham’s cultural pluralists and those 
aligned with the PSEA exorcists—their fundamental difference over 
their ideologies of “Asia.” By 1998, a small group of delegates in the 
                                                                                                                                              
21 Ibid, 14. Ingham’s logic resembled the assumptions of other religious scholars, such 
as Harvard University’s Diana Eck, who remarked in 2001 that the religious sites she 
had studied in India were now coming to the United States, and the interdisciplinary 
team of British Columbian Asian studies claiming that the globalization of Vancou-
ver meant that Asian religions had reshaped the urban landscape. 
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DoNW that had since the late 1980s repeatedly introduced resolutions 
to allow parishes to use a rite to publicly bless same-sex couples sur-
prisingly found their initiative, known at the 1998 synod as Motion 9, 
undercut by a very narrow margin. While Ingham was compelled to 
reject this motion because it did not have enough votes, the voting gap 
narrowed in the 2001 synod. In the lead-up to the 2002 synod, Ingham 
issued a statement known as Motion 7 to help Motion 9 pass. Ad-
dressed to all parishes in the DoNW—but especially to the dissenting 
ones—Ingham sought to “resolve the impasse” blocking Motion 9 by 
appointing a “Canadian bishop from outside this diocese to offer pas-
toral care to those parishes and clergy who desire it” while not requir-
ing any member of the diocese to “act against their conscience in the 
blessing of same-sex unions” (though he acknowledged that he could 
not “bind” his “successors in this matter”). With this in mind, Ingham 
indicated that he intended to approve Motion 9 if the synod’s votes car-
ried it. In this way, Ingham sought to “maintain the highest level of 
communion in our diocese where there is honest disagreement on Mo-
tion 9” by recognizing “the legitimate pastoral needs of different 
members of the church” so that everyone could “remain the diocesan 
family” with “a measure of tolerance, hospitality, and mutual respect 
from all of us, and a period of continuing work at reconciliation.” 
Yet the dissenting parishes that had already been disgruntled by 
Ingham’s cultural pluralism imagined that this yet more radical move 
toward pluralization—one attempting even to include dissent on the 
rite of same-sex blessings—would marginalize them. As the votes fell 
215 to 129 in favor of Motion 9 in June 2002, a group of eight parishes 
walked out of the synod, rejecting Ingham’s proposal, and announced 
the formation of the ACiNW; this in turn triggered the need for a 
meeting of the ACC in Hong Kong calling for Ingham to explain why 
the DoNW had proceeded unilaterally on the liberalization of sexuality 
policy without the rest of the Communion. Cultural pluralization, it 
seemed, had led to sexual liberalization. But was the ACiNW’s disa-
greement with the DoNW only over sex? To answer that question, our 
tale must turn from the DoNW to one of the leaders of the synod 
walk-out who eventually became the bishop of the ACiC, Silas Ng. 
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“THE ALTAR HAS BEEN DEFILED!”: 
BISHOP SILAS NG’S IDEOLOGY OF PURIFYING EXORCISM 
 
A number of persons claimed to speak for the ACiNW in its early days, 
but few were Chinese.22 Responding to Ingham’s comments to the 
ACC in Hong Kong that Motion 9 was to care for lesbian and gay per-
sons as “victims of persecution” by the church, the Reverend Ed Hird 
clarified that the ACiNW had simply been adhering to the 1998 Lam-
beth Conference Resolution 1.10 that blessing same-sex unions was 
incompatible with scriptural authority.23 Writing to Ingham after the 
Diocese of Yukon’s Bishop Terry Buckle backed away from providing 
episcopal oversight to the ACiNW, the Reverend Trevor Walters wrote 
on behalf of the ACiNW clergy that Ingham’s demands that the lay 
people in individual parishes must decide whether or not to stay within 
the DoNW was “an attempt to bully them out of the church which they 
love and to abandon the doctrines of the church to which they ad-
here.”24 Although these communiqués often included the names of 
clergy like Silas Ng, Stephen Leung, and Simon Chin (Chen Zhongwen 
???; then-rector of St Matthias and St Luke’s), the Chinese rectors 
who became bishops—Ng and Leung—are seldom represented in the 
documents as agents of dissent and realignment except in their own 
parishes. Situating them on the realignment’s main stage, it becomes 
much more apparent that the ACiNW’s dissent from the DoNW was 
about much more than sexuality, for Ng and Leung can be seen as 
Asian Anglicans continuing the disagreement of the 1990s between the 
ideologies of actually-Asian Anglicans and Ingham’s use of Asian reli-
gions to propagate his ideology of cultural pluralization. 
                                                                                                                                              
22 The qualifier here is that the ACiNW did have Chinese Anglican lay members who 
could speak as representatives to the local Chinese press, but the point stands that the 
way this DoNW schism is often recounted usually does not include Chinese Angli-
cans as active agents. 
23 David Virtue, “ACiNW Responds to Bishop Ingham’s Haven for Persecuted Homo-
sexuals,” Virtue Online, September 24, 2002, accessed October 25, 2016, 
http://listserv.virtueonline.org/pipermail/virtueonline_listserv.virtueonline.org/2002-
September/004148.html. 
24 David Virtue, “ACiNW Clergy Sad at Ingham’s Decision to Proceed against Them,” 
Virtue Online, April 1, 2003, accessed October 25, 2016, 
http://listserv.virtueonline.org/pipermail/virtueonline_listserv.virtueonline.org/2003-
April/004923.html. 
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It can in fact be argued that Silas Ng, originally a member of 
Ingham’s inner circle of advisors and a creative priest that Ingham had 
tasked with planting the Church of Emmanuel as a Chinese parish in 
the largely-Chinese suburb of Richmond, can be regarded as one of the 
pioneers of the synod walkout, thanks in no small part to his 
charismatic gifts and exorcist sensibilities. In the key informant 
interview that I conducted with him, he told me that one of his earliest 
charismatic experiences occurred in the early spring of 2002 when he 
“received a word” from God—“Exodus”—and proceeded to 
communicate this word in a meeting to the clergy who were reportedly 
“shocked”: “Do we need to go as extreme as ‘exodus’?” he remembers 
them musing; in fact, he recounted how one priest who later became 
prominent in the ACiNW attempted to “talk him out of this word” 
while he was having his car fixed at an auto dealer in Richmond.25 As 
Ng tells the story, one of Ng’s parish members—another ethnic 
Chinese person—then received a second prophetic word, “walk out,” in 
the late spring. 
Ng noted that if they stayed in the DoNW, they would “not be part 
of Jesus’ church” because they would be “out of the Bible.” Convinced 
of this, the clergy who subsequently composed the ACiNW prepared to 
walk out, at which point (as Ng recounts) Bishop Ingham saw each of 
the “rebellious pastors” in private to chide them on their 
insubordination. In response, Ng reportedly told Ingham about the 
word that he had received “from the Lord,” to which Ingham was 
allegedly surprised that “in this century, you can really hear Jesus,” so 
Ng pulled out his spiritual journal to show him the exact date on which 
he had received the word. It can therefore be inferred from Ng’s 
account that these charismatic experiences led in a major way to the 
formation of the ACiNW, although when I asked him about the 
prominence of Chinese Anglicans in the breakaway, he responded, 
“No, I am the only one who brought the message. It was my personal 
reception, and at our every-week meeting, many people had messages.” 
What this denial affirms, of course, is that the charismatic 
experiences—and Ng’s, in particular—lay in the background of the 
2002 walk-out. 
What was also true, however, was that Ng’s insistence on trusting 
the validity of these supernatural experiences led to a split within the 
ACiNW itself. In 2002 and 2003, the ACiNW had attempted to pursue 
                                                                                                                                              
25 Bishop Silas Tak-yin Ng, personal communication, October 16, 2013. All subsequent 
quotes from Ng are from this key informant interview unless otherwise indicated. 
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an “inside strategy” of staying within the ACoC in order to keep their 
property. Ng told me that it was in fact he who then “thought of an out-
side strategy because the ACoC had already blessed same-sex, so we 
should not hold the licence.” He explained, 
A spiritual tie is like a virus, so I described it like D-Day. They are 
only tricking the outsiders before the main force. They have some 
men on the beach, and then the main force. So I said that we should 
treat them like D-Day, and we got into an argument. 
In other words, Ng insisted on a view of spiritual warfare in a way that 
was not unlike the sensibilities of Archbishop Tay calling for the exor-
cism of Vancouver due to the Stanley Park totem poles. Indeed, as the 
disagreement about the “inside” and “outside” strategy escalated, Ng 
and his colleagues attended the AMiA Winter Conference in the United 
States, where they brokered their reception into the Anglican Province 
of Rwanda through none other than Moses Tay and his successor, 
Archbishop Yong Ping-chung (Yang Pingzhong ???). Not one to 
shy from a good dramatic moment, Ng returned to the ACoC parish 
where REC had been housed and declared as part of a liturgical cere-
mony that “the altar had been defiled.” In a well-timed moment caught 
in a newspaper photo that still hangs framed in REC’s new location, 
Ng tore his DoNW clergy license into pieces and led his congregation 
to march across the town with a cross held high to a vacant warehouse 
that they rented as a church home. The significance of this act, which 
was one of the founding moments of the Anglican Coalition in Canada 
(ACiC) as a new entity, should not be understated: as other ACiNW 
clergy such as the Reverend Ed Hird in North Vancouver and the Rev-
erend Barclay Mayo in Pender Harbour followed suit with equal flair, 
this full embrace of the “outside strategy” also dramatically divided 
them from the ACiNW’s strategy of internal dissent in the ACoC by 
drawing the ACiC literally into a new Anglican province (Rwanda, 
brokered by the PSEA). 26  Indeed, the shattering of the ACiNW 
movement meant that those pursuing the “inside strategy” also had to 
find a new name: the Anglican Network in Canada (ANiC). 
The “Chineseness” here is subtle; it has more to do with the fact that 
Ng and his parish had to work out the question of their “spiritual ties” 
                                                                                                                                              
26 Martha N. Sison, “Evicted Congregations to Leave Buildings,” Anglican Journal, 
May 1, 2005, accessed October 26, 2016, http://www.anglicanjournal.com/articles/ 
evicted-congregations-to-leave-buildings-2877. 
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in the context of both Metro Vancouver’s Chinese Canadian 
community and their newfound affiliations with the PSEA’s primates, 
who both shared Ng’s charismatic approach. Indeed, prior to becoming 
bishop, Ng had been the face of Asian Anglicanism for the AMiA, 
serving as the “Network Leader” of the “Asian Initiative” (AI) to plant 
Asian churches across North America. AI’s greatest success was a 
Chinese church in Toronto aptly named after the new cathedral, 
Toronto Emmanuel Church, though this achievement, according to 
Ng’s account, also triggered an international dispute with Hong Kong 
Anglicans over the new parish’s plot of land in Toronto. In Ng’s view, 
this was a case of “spiritual warfare” marked by “friendly fire.” This 
Toronto church plant had come out of a larger Chinese Anglican parish 
in Toronto, St John’s McNicoll, because the donor of its building fund 
had wanted to pull out of the ACoC and join AI, triggering others at St 
John’s to appeal to Anglican bishops in Hong Kong to send letters 
accusing Ng of “stealing sheep and the church.” The sphere of such 
action—a dispute within the SKH world—suggests yet again that Ng’s 
charismatic practices need to be understood from the perspective of 
what it means to be “Chinese” and “Asian” as an Anglican. Although 
Ng has been just made the Apostolic Vicar of the newly formed 
Anglican Mission in Canada (an update of the ACiC) in 2016, his 
sensibilities are perhaps best understood as emerging from the 
production of an Asian Anglicanism contrasting Ingham’s 
post-Christendom ideology. Where Ingham sought to accommodate 
new Asian religious pluralism, Ng wanted to reclaim Christendom 
through spiritual warfare, exorcism, and charismatic purification. 
In engaging such spiritual warfare, Ng found new allies among 
Chinese evangelicals, as they combatted political and cultural liberal-
ism in Canada with the weapons of spiritual warfare. Ng told me of 
“prayer walks” that he had led to claim the land of Richmond for 
Christ’s sovereignty: 
I can only say that ever since the Lord above told Joshua that every 
part of the land that he walks will be his—that is one of the prayer 
walk texts—and I also see that around the world there are prayer 
walks—at that time was Marching for Jesus—Marching for Jesus 
was in those years that was the lead-up to same-sex marriage pass-
ing. . . so I consider that prayer walk is a spiritual action. 
Here, the link between the exorcists’ twin objections to Ingham’s 
proposals for cultural and sexual pluralization become apparent: 
instead of accepting the social changes to Christendom that come with 
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processes like globalization, Christ’s land must be reclaimed. Such 
reclamation requires the physical act of walking (the “walk-out,” the 
“prayer-walk”), accompanied with an active cutting of ties with 
spiritual forces that are interpreted as against Christ’s sovereignty, such 
as the totem poles and the DoNW. Ng also spoke in this way of the 
“spiritual warfare beyond what we can understand in the principalities” 
when it came to praying for Canada’s national leadership. Over the 
course of thirty weeks before one Canadian federal election, Ng led his 
parish to pray for each of the Members of Parliament (MPs) by name. 
“So suddenly, the Conservatives win!” He exclaimed, revealing that 
the purpose of his prayers was to usher in a new spiritual leadership 
that could abate the liberalizing path of the Canadian nation-state, 
although he was very clear that he had never told his parish members 
how to vote, nor had he attempted to manipulate the political process. 
“I am not the only church praying for the MPs, only the first!” He 
clarified, telling me that he had also suggested the idea to the 
Vancouver Chinese Evangelical Ministerial Fellowship (VCEMF)—a 
local interdenominational gathering of all Chinese evangelical pastors 
and voluntary staff workers—with an emphasis on saying the “name” 
of each MP for the prayers to take hold. 
It is therefore that Ng, as a Chinese Anglican and an Asian Angli-
can, practices and mobilizes for spiritual warfare through prayer tech-
niques. This Chineseness—these “Asian values”—are the diametrical 
opposite to Ingham’s acceptance of the global economy’s disruption of 
Christendom. In this view, if Christendom is being disrupted, the forces 
disrupting it cannot only be material; they must be spiritual. These 
transcendent shifts are not to be passively accepted; instead, Anglicans 
should be actors in supernatural sphere, claiming back the land, cutting 
it off from spiritually malicious forces, and achieving spiritual purifica-
tion of the world. In this way, the flow of Chinese migrants and Asian 
Anglicans into Vancouver is not to be interpreted as cause for pluraliz-
ing the DoNW’s way of thinking. Instead, they are agents of purifica-
tion who can be mobilized to exorcise Vancouver—an ideological 
formulation that, as we shall see in Stephen Leung’s case, also made 
some Chinese Anglicans uncomfortable. 
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SHAME IN A WORLD OF LAW:  
STEPHEN LEUNG’S IDEOLOGY OF  
MULTICULTURAL SPIRITUALITY 
 
One of the legal sagas that was widely-discussed in Vancouver’s civil 
society in the late 2000s was a case that was decided in the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia known as Bentley et al v. Anglican Synod of 
the Diocese of New Westminster, 2010 BCCA 506. The case revolved 
around ANiC, whose parishes had by 2008 given up on the inside 
strategy when the national ACoC’s General Synod voted in 2007 to 
declare that positions on same-sex relationships were not matters of 
“core doctrine (in the sense of being creedal),” effectively opening the 
door to amending the marriage canon to affirm same-sex marriage, 
which was done in 2016.27 Because the parishes in ANiC did consider 
the matter of same-sex unions as core to the doctrine of sin, they voted 
to withdraw from the ACoC to join the Anglican Province of the 
Southern Cone in 2008 before merging with the newly-formed ACNA 
as its Canadian diocese in 2009. Understanding that Ingham intended 
then to lay claim to their buildings, ANiC fired first, suing the DoNW 
on the basis of a precedent case from the 1980s that if a religious soci-
ety had departed from its original founding purposes, it could no longer 
have claim to its building. Bentley thus turned theological doctrine into 
a legal matter, claiming that the DoNW had departed from “historic 
Anglican orthodoxy,” which meant that the ANiC parishes holding to a 
traditional Christian understanding of sexuality could keep their build-
ings. Although the case was decided against ANiC, the consolation 
prize was that one of ANiC’s Chinese parishes, the Church of the Good 
Shepherd, could keep a $2.2 million bequest from one of its late pa-
rishioners, Dr. Daphne Wai-chan Chun, to fund its possible needs for a 
new building. Transforming Anglicanism in Vancouver into an arena 
of ecclesiastical legal wrangling, Bentley was also the context in which 
Stephen Leung became bishop in September 2009 over ANiC’s Asian 
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wp-content/uploads/a051-R2.pdf. 
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and Multicultural Ministries in Canada (AMMiC), a non-territorial ar-
rangement in which Leung lay claim to episcopal oversight to all per-
sons with “visible minority” status in ANiC, especially Asians. As with 
Ng, re-situating Leung in this discussion highlights how sexuality is 
only symptomatic of an Anglican dispute about global shifts and plu-
ralization using “Chineseness” and “Asian values” as ideological prox-
ies. 
While Ng had a flair for the supernaturally dramatic, Leung’s rea-
soning often waxed rationalistic, almost with a certain legal brilliance. 
For Leung, Ingham’s embrace of pluralism represented a failure of 
reason and coherence, conceptually “separating salvation from social 
ethics,” as he put it, which made his theological formulations problem-
atic.28 However, it did not follow that (as Ng demanded) defectiveness 
demands the total separation of spiritual ties, for the universe in which 
Leung operated was as legal as it was supernatural. Leung insisted that 
joining the synod walk-out did not mean that he had ever left the 
ACoC. Articulating his rationale for remaining within ANiC’s “inside 
strategy,” he said: 
I told the ACoC, “I can’t take this.” I asked Canada to help me, but 
they pushed me, marginalized me. I appealed to the Communion, to 
the Global South; I never left the Communion, but they gave me a 
way out . . . If the ACoC goes back to the orthodox faith in its canons 
and constitutions, I would go back, but I can’t go with a defective 
declaration. 
In other words, he had watched as the ACoC’s internal legal structure 
had itself become defective through what he considered its theological 
gymnastics in not disciplining the DoNW for Motion 9 in 2002, mak-
ing way for the “core doctrine” vote at the national synod in 2007. Cre-
atively maneuvering with Anglican polity, Leung justified his partici-
pation in the walk-out as leaving this defective legal structure while 
staying within the “Communion,” remaining in a larger ecclesiastical 
apparatus while waiting to see whether the ACoC would reverse course 
on its canonical defectiveness. 
In the same way, Leung had also been prepared for the civil impli-
cations of these problems in ecclesiastical law, although this prepara-
tion was ultimately attributed to supernatural intervention. As one of 
                                                                                                                                              
28 Stephen Wing-hong Leung, personal communication, May 5, 2011. All quotes from 
Leung are from this interview, unless other indicated. 
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his trustees, lawyer Peter Si-kun Li, told me, Leung’s realization that 
he was being marginalized by the ACoC had resulted in a stroke of 
both brilliance and divine providence in relation to the ownership of his 
parish’s building. As Li recounted: 
Then you see that the miracle is that if we had smoothly found 
something at the time and bought a building, with a ruling like this, 
that building would belong to the diocese, meaning that we would 
have lost it. But because we were not able to, could not find a suita-
ble place, and we just held it, held it, then when the case comes, we 
are still holding onto that fund and then we had a separate filing 
about that. So although the other buildings were lost to the diocese, 
that bequest was still given back to us. If it had not been separated, it 
would have been gone too. 
Indeed, in the early 2000s, the Church of the Good Shepherd had been 
searching for a building; unable to find one, they resorted to swapping 
properties with the Metropolitan Temple, a Pentecostal church: “There 
was a church that took pity on us, and we were able to use their build-
ing for a time.”29 Providential as this story is, what it ultimately illus-
trates is that Leung and his parishioners understood themselves to live 
in a world primarily governed by civil and canon law. God may be able 
to provide a way out of legal traps, but being agents in the world, 
whether ecclesiastical or legal, requires some understanding of the law. 
Terming this legal apparatus to be “Western” and symptom of a 
“guilt” culture in which right and wrong are determined by one’s 
standing before the law, Leung explained his actions as part of a co-
herent Chinese culture that engaged this world of law with a “shame” 
culture. Indeed, he writes in his Master of Theology thesis—one super-
vised at Regent College by its founder, Professor James Houston—that 
this was a duality which he found useful for ministering in Chinese 
evangelical contexts. Repeating his findings to me in our interview, he 
told me that “Western” cultures tended to be “guilt-based” in the sense 
that they adhered to legal norms, whereas “Chinese” culture was 
“shame-based” because wrongdoing struck at the core of one’s interior 
identity, leading to a loss of “face.”30 “For Asians in general,” he ex-
                                                                                                                                              
29 Peter Si-kun Li, personal communication, September 21, 2011. 
30 Stephen Wing-hong Leung, Face-Shame in the Chinese Culture: A Divine Reverse 
for Spiritual Growth in Christian Community (Unpublished ThM thesis, Regent Col-
lege, Vancouver, BC, 2001). Leung’s readings of shame in Chinese culture in con-
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plained, “shame is predominant. The key of the house is shame. So the 
purpose of Asian theology is to see shame.” Promoting an ideology of 
“Asianness” and “Chineseness” that is yet again different from Ingham 
and Ng, Leung pinpointed “shame” as the ideological content of 
“Asian” cultures, especially “Chinese” culture, in a way that could be 
positioned over against a dominating legal culture: 
The problem is that we use the law to discipline people because we 
fear punishment. For example, we say that the law prohibits speed-
ing. Now we can teach people not to speed in a different way—“so 
be a good citizen”—use this approach to develop the inside, so for 
example, the difference from legalism in the Bible, not by human ef-
fort.31 
The subtext here is that shame and guilt are not mutually exclusive; 
shame is in fact deeper than guilt, for while the law demands external 
conformity, the shame-based culture that Leung attributes to Asia (and 
therefore, China) leads to deep, internal transformation. “Asian val-
ues,” in other words, are about interior spirituality, as opposed to the 
legal obsessions of the West. 
What this means in turn is that persons formed by shame can possi-
bly outplay their guilt-formed Western brethren on the legal arena. In-
deed, Leung suggested that both factors—“guilt” and “shame”—led to 
his tactical abilities in maneuvering ANiC’s “inside strategy” until the 
withdrawal in 2008. For Leung, Anglicanism was a matter of “shame” 
because it was more than just being part of a legal system, although he 
said that the accusations launched against him in his role in the rea-
lignment often made reference to this institutional apparatus: 
In my struggling, I was labeled as splitting the church. This is 
“guilt”. . . . Splitting the church is a guilt accusation against an insti-
tutional church, and I am excommunicated. 
However, Anglicanism for Leung was in fact more about an identity 
that was as core to his being as his “Chineseness”: 
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Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. 
31 Leung, personal communication. 
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For example, shame is when I go back to Hong Kong, I am not seen 
as Anglican. It would for example be like them saying that I am not 
Chinese; it’s not my language. 
Leung thus repudiated Ingham’s attempts to discipline him as stem-
ming from a legal, “guilt-based” understanding of Anglicanism, alt-
hough he also suggested that if Ingham wanted to play legal games 
with him, he could hit back in a “Western” law-centered way. Appeal-
ing to “freedom of speech,” he said that one particularly poignant threat 
that Ingham had issued was that he would “take our licenses.” This 
threat had been based on evidence from “our sermons against the dio-
cese and the bishop—I said something that I disagreed with him.” In-
stead of trying to shame the bishop, Leung turns to legal language: 
“This was never discussed, that this can be evidence. This is a matter of 
free speech. It’s not just me; all the dissenting clergy know about this.” 
Ingham, Leung suggested, had misunderstood his Chinese clergy, iron-
ic because Ingham was the one who had first argued for accepting 
globalization and the arrival of Asian religions in Vancouver. Leung 
implied that if Ingham really professed to understand Asian religions, 
he should have known better than to threaten his Chinese priests with 
the law, as they were able to beat him at his own game given the 
shame-formation that (for Leung) actually constitutes the core ideology 
of Asian religion and Chinese values. 
As bishop over ANiC’s AMMiC segment, Leung works out this 
ideology of shame-based Asian values in church ministry. As one of 
Leung’s priests Rev. Anson Ann puts it, there is on the one hand a 
global Asian network to which AMMiC is connected, including being 
“in close contact with” the PSEA’s new primates—Archbishop John 
Chew when I interviewed Ann and Leung—while starting new rela-
tionships with churches and organizations “in Malaysia and China,” 
such as a partnership with International China Concern (ICC; a 
non-profit organization for orphans in the People’s Republic of China 
[PRC]) as well as short-term mission teams to Thailand and Myanmar. 
This energy in AMMiC, as Ann put it, had the raison d”être “so we 
know that we’re tied to Asia, there is a purpose for us to be here, God 
didn’t bring us here just to enjoy our retirement lives.” Yet all of these 
bridging relationships were also productive for clarifying what Asia 
and “Asian values” are ideologically: 
Ever since Bishop Stephen became a bishop, I see he has been . . . 
well, he knows very clearly that he’s not just being a bishop of Asian 
ministry in Vancouver and North America—he is called to be a 
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bridge for Asian Christianity and North American Christianity . . . . 
We’re meant to be a bridge to lands both ways, since we’re privi-
leged this way, we speak both languages.32 
By “both languages,” Ann conflates a particular “Chinese” language 
with “Asian,” as the two common languages between him and Leung 
are Cantonese and English. Reading Asian values from de facto “Chi-
nese” assumptions, “Asian Christianity” and “North American Christi-
anity” are posited as fundamentally separate ontological entities that 
must be bridged. As Leung told me in our 2011 interview, there would 
be a series of conferences for Vancouver’s local Asian evangelicals 
(and indeed, I attended the 2011 and 2012 iterations as part of my field 
work) that would not be exclusive to Anglicans: “It is not Anglican; 
they will not go that far. It’s too fast for the first conference to do an 
Anglican Eucharist. We have to strike the balance with evangelicals, or 
they will complain, or they will not come if we do not get the trust first. 
You want us all to become Anglican?” He quipped, mimicking the pos-
sible lingering evangelical suspiciousness at his liturgical sensibilities. 
This non-exclusivity in terms of denomination would facilitate the dis-
cussion of “Asian” (or rather, “Chinese”) culture and its implications 
for ministry as an attempt to educate all attendees, regardless of ethnic-
ity, about the need to minister at a shame-based ontological level in-
stead of remaining at the legal surface. Drawing over 150 attendees at 
each year’s conference who were mostly Chinese evangelicals without 
backgrounds in Anglicanism, AMMiC’s ministry suggests that Leung’s 
participation in Vancouver’s Anglican realignment also aligned him 
with local non-Anglican Chinese evangelicals. 
This educational mandate suggests that Leung’s understanding of 
shame comes from his spiritual sensibility and awareness about an al-
ternate ideological approach to a world that he understands as governed 
by legal apparatuses. While Ingham argues that Anglicans must accept 
a post-Christendom that has shifted through economic globalization 
and Ng argues for the retaking of Christendom through charismatic 
practice, Leung understands the world as a heavily regulated set of le-
gal networks and mechanisms that has even crept its way into Angli-
canism’s modus operandi. To be “Asian” is not to resist this world; it is 
to learn to play the game better than the players themselves by invest-
ing in a spirituality that is deeper than what this law-obsessed universe 
offers. Such a view can be contrasted with Ng’s “outside strategy” of 
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completely cutting ties with a spiritually corrupt world; for Leung, the 
ACoC—and Vancouver’s legal apparatus, for that matter—are only 
defective, which means that their apparatuses offer tools that those with 
enough interior, shame-based, self-cultivation can use to great ad-
vantage. This process of integrating shame in a guilt-based world forms 
the crux of Leung’s episcopal ministry, rounding out the map of three 
very different versions of “Asian values” at work in constituting the 
Anglican realignment in Vancouver. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
“CHINESENESS” AND “ASIAN VALUES” 
IN THIS TALE OF THREE BISHOPS 
 
The frequent complaint from those following Edward Said in 
unmasking the field of orientalism as an intellectual fraud is that this 
discussion of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” seldom takes into 
account the agency of Asians themselves. In this tale of three bishops, 
Chinese Anglican bishops are part and parcel of the creation of 
“Chineseness” and “Asian values” that are distinctively made in 
Vancouver. The centering of Asian subjects in the narrative about the 
Anglican realignment in Vancouver that supposedly began in 2002 
reveals that the divisions in the DoNW were formed as early as the 
1990s. The dispute was not so much about sex as it was over the 
meanings of Asianness and Chineseness amidst the global migrations 
reshaping Vancouver as a city. What I have attempted to produce is 
what might be called an “ideological map” exploring how the three 
bishops theorized their participation in a liberal global economy and 
civil society. For the DoNW’s Bishop Ingham, these economic shifts 
signaled a change in the demographic makeup of global cities like 
Vancouver, demanding that Anglicans passively acquiesce to 
post-Christendom where religions from Asia would be dominant. 
Countering Ingham was a reassertion of Christendom by Asian 
Anglicans themselves, beginning with the PSEA’s Archbishop Tay and 
following on through the charismatic practices of the ACiC’s Silas Ng 
as assertion of genuine Asian agency. Yet not all Asian Anglicans 
agreed with such a dynamically exorcist approach, allowing for the 
possibility of a third Chineseness advocated by ANiC’s Stephen Leung 
in a mode of shame-based spirituality that could form Asian Anglican 
subjects to outwit the guilt-based legal apparatuses that are dominant 
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modes of governance in both ecclesial and civil circles. In the emerging 
field of Chinese Christianities, perhaps the question that could be posed 
is: What forms of Chineseness are Christians inventing, and for what 
purposes? 
This inquiry into Chineseness is also a pertinent question for the 
field of Anglican studies, where energy is often expended on the de-
velopment of theological tradition and the emergence of post-colonial 
forms of Anglicanism. Taking seriously the Chinese bishops in my tale 
as actors in the realignment in their own right, a further avenue of re-
search might inquire into what extent ideologies of globalization using 
“Asian values” and “Chineseness” as proxies might be coming to con-
stitute the Communion’s thinking at a global scale. For example, Arch-
bishop Paul Kwong now not only acts in his capacity as HKSKH’s 
primate, but also both as the chair of the Canterbury-appointed ACC as 
one of its instruments of unity as well as in a more civic position as a 
member of the PRC’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer-
ence (CPPCC). Kwong’s standing in the Anglican Communion as a 
Chinese primate—arguably the Chinese primate—gives him not only 
the space to develop ideologies of Chineseness that will yet again be 
different from this tale of three bishops, but also the platform to propa-
gate these ideologies across the Communion. As Kwong explains in a 
book that proposes a Hong Kong identity reconcilable with a national 
Chinese one, generating this ideology is intimately linked to his role in 
the Anglican Communion; both, after all, have to do with developing 
identities—ideological forms—for the sake of reconciliation: 
In writing this book, and in thinking about the issue of identity in 
community, my focus has been on Hong Kong. But through my par-
ticipation in bishops’ meetings, and in conversations with Christians 
from around the globe, I have come to believe that our experience in 
Hong Kong may also have implications for churches in other parts of 
the Anglican Communion.33 
Like the other bishops in this paper, Kwong is thus invested in devel-
oping an ideology of Chineseness—in his case because the global fu-
ture he imagines is one in which Hong Kong must work with an 
emerging PRC on a world stage. 
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The political manifestations of Kwong’s identity construction are 
significant for both Hong Kong as well as for the Anglican Commun-
ion. Biblical exegete Sam Tsang accuses Kwong of putting “the burden 
on the ‘Hong Kong people’ not to be xenophobic and discriminatory” 
while failing “to consider altogether the seriousness of the mainland 
invasion and the Hong Kong government’s own violation of the Basic 
Law” when voicing his opposition to the pro-democracy Umbrella 
Movement in 2014.34 Indeed, I would be remiss in a paper on the SKH 
in Ching Feng to mention HKSKH’s withdrawal from the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong’s Divinity School of Chung Chi College on 
similar grounds. While HKSKH insists that this move was purely ad-
ministrative, critics of its timing point out that it occurred alongside 
both Kwong’s critical comments on the Umbrella Movement and the 
broad support of Divinity School faculty and students for Hong Kong 
democracy, suggesting that there might be an aspect of the split along 
the lines of differing global visions cloaked in an ideology of Chinese-
ness.35 If the construction of identity leads to such political divisive-
ness, questions can be asked about how Kwong’s well-meaning pro-
posals to construct identities for reconciliation on the Anglican 
Communion’s global stage will turn out. This line of inquiry is im-
portant, after all, given both the tale of three bishops and Kwong’s sta-
tus as a Chinese Anglican chairing one of the Communion’s instru-
ments of unity (the ACC). The ideological construction of Chineseness 
and Asian values is no longer internal to SKH circles but is now pre-
sented as a Communion-wide question. 
Such an inquiry into Anglicanism would necessitate an intervention 
in the field of Global Christianity as well. In a stunning review of how 
the term “Global South Christianity” became an equivalent to “Global 
Christianity,” Michael Nai-chiu Poon reveals that the entire field based 
on the term “Global Christianity” is indebted to the Anglican Com-
munion’s usage of the term “Global South Anglican” to denote the bloc 
of dissenting archbishops who also happened to be from regions of the 
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world troubled by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the early 2000s.36 With 
Anglicanism at the core of Global Christian studies, the line of inquiry 
I have advanced asks for more serious reflection on why ideologies 
may not be so clear in surface realities. Although the phenomena that 
seem to have realigned the Anglican Communion and are predicted to 
reshape geographies of Global Christianity ostensibly revolve around 
sexual morality and charismatic revival movements, how are all of 
these phenomena related to processes in the global economy? And to 
what extent are they shaped by what Žižek so provocatively calls “cap-
italism with Asian values,” which he frequently qualifies as having 
“nothing to do with Asian people and everything to do with the clear 
and present tendency of contemporary capitalism as such to suspend 
democracy”?37 What are the material processes necessitating the pro-
duction of ideologies prescribing interpretations of Global Christianity 
as a revival of Christendom in the Global South, and how might exam-
ining ideologies of Chineseness and Asian values in the arena of Glob-
al Christian studies yield insights into how the “Global South” is con-
stituted and what the real place of sexuality is in these debates? 
In each of these extended lines of inquiry from this tale of three 
bishops, I am proposing to take the study of Chinese religions on the 
road, to inquire about what “Chineseness” and “Asian values” are at an 
ontological level in fields that do not typically make such inquiries. 
Revealing that this question is important in unexpected areas of study 
such as Anglican studies, Global Christian studies, and urban geogra-
phy in the context of global economy, the ideological map that I have 
made ultimately shows that ideologies of Chineseness and Asian values 
are often placed together, but usually result in dividing. But if the 
Three Kingdoms is right, what is divided must unite. Perhaps it is 
through the interrogation of these all-too-reified categories of “Chi-
neseness” and “Asian values” that such new networks of solidarity, 
bonds of affection, and even communion can be developed. 
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